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Greece, Financialization and the EU: The Political Economy of 
Debt and Destruction: Book Review 
 
Christoforos Bouzanis and Georgios A. Panos† 
 
This review offers an overview of the textbook, titled “Greece, Financialization and the EU: 
The Political Economy of Debt and Destruction” (2013, Palgrave), by Dimoulas and Fouskas. 
The book is available in Serbian, Croatian and Greek in more recent editions. Founded on 
analytical tools from geopolitics, international relations, sociology and political economy, the 
authors embark on an exciting journey that intends to provide a critical viewpoint on the 
specifics on the Greek debt crisis. We have found the analysis of the book as a most 
illuminating primer on the modern Greek tragedy, an important complementary tool in its 
analysis, and as a most useful text in the shelf of crisis analysts. 
This is an intuitive book that attains a systematic historical approach to the so called 
modern ‘Greek drama’, while presenting it as a characteristic example of the intrinsic 
contradictions, asymmetries and antinomies of contemporary global capitalist relations. It is in 
this sense that we take this analysis to contribute to the existing literature of the post-Marxist 
international political economy in a twofold way: it offers a theoretical contribution and a case 
study. The former refers to the emphasis on geo-politics and geo-strategy of security that are 
factors which contribute to the formulation and transformation of the structure of the global 
flows and uneven development of the capital. Then, Greece is a characteristic case study as a 
country of the periphery of the European Union, that is placed in this structure of dependency 
and exploitation. However, the authors also underline the role of neo-liberalism in the 
discursive formulation of local and regional elites in the periphery and semi-periphery. These 
elites participate in the ideological legitimization of those practices that sustain the structures 
of dependency, in the form of global/regional fault-lines that both expand and undermine the 
contemporary formulation of the capital.  
Following these lines, the authors are very careful in coming to terms with recent 
tendencies in social theory and the related focus on the indeterminacy of agential intervention 
in socio-cultural transformation. For them, agency is as important as structure, since their 
analysis constitutes an insightful theoretical struggle in reconciling the notion of structural 
tendency with the idea that various agencies – including bureaucracies of the state as well as 
investors and political parties – can take geo-strategic political and/or economic decisions that 
can transcend immediate class interest. Yet, the authors take a more radical step in their multi-
factored analysis of the capital formation and re-formulation: ‘Global fault-lines are the 
discursive articulation of economic, political, ideational and geo-political instances in a social 
struggle’ (Fouskas and Dimoulas, 2013: 44). The idea of the discursive formulation of 
institutional and structural social forms is, according to our view, an insightful contribution of 
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the authors to an ongoing revealing discussion on global and regional structures of dependency 
and their ontological relation with ideational and cultural elements. Whether post-Marxism can 
allow for this discursive construction is a future theoretical challenge.  
The first part of the book offers a theoretical overview on financialization and the 
European integration process. In Chapter 2, the authors explain that their focal point is to 
present the ways in which debt and its formulation are a constituent part of the crises of modern 
capitalism – the ways in which the state and the dominant class fraction in the periphery are 
related in a structural mode of asymmetrical circulation of values. This takes the form of an 
international apparatus of uneven development and exploitation that is strategically and 
ideologically guided by the centre/core. Indeed, ideological orientations are not without a role 
in this global terrain of uneven development, since, the authors do not fall into the trap of over-
determination in a base/superstructure schema and, instead, underline the theoretical need to 
incorporate in our analyses the ways in which the ideological pervasiveness of neoliberalism 
and the omnipresent relevance of geopolitics are part and parcel of the organic whole of modern 
capitalism and of its periodic crises. In this picture, credit and debt constitute the hydraulics of 
the production, reproduction and expansion of both real and fictitious values.  
It is at this point that one should clarify that the authors follow Marx's theory of value 
in their analysis of money, production, distribution and debt. In this context, by the term 
'fictitious capital' the authors point to the money that does not correspond to the real production 
of value by the workers, and which enables capitalism to survive, because of the partial revival 
of investment that this fictitious money enables. This remark casts light on what the authors 
call the 'sinews of capital': ideology, geopolitics, commodity production and distribution and 
fictitious financial/credit practices, as well as governmental semi-dependent relevant activity 
in a global terrain consisting of various structures and agencies. These set the apparatus of 
modern capitalism in motion. It is in this sense, that the idea of the sinews of capital supports 
later Marx's nomology of tendencies rather than a crude materialistic form of economism. 
Therefore, the resulting political economy of debt underlines state security as one of the various 
factors that co-determinate the structure of capital formulations and their flows in a global 
terrain.  
As we shall show later, these remarks enable the authors to proceed to an insightful 
multi-factored assessment of what really happened in the so called ‘modern Greek drama’. This 
assessment is conducted in relation to the geo-strategic position of Greece, its historical and 
cultural specificities and its status as a dependent state of the periphery of the modern global 
scenery, which comprises of relations of uneven development. For the moment, the distinction 
between real and fictitious capital becomes crucial for the analysis of the intrinsic production 
of crises. It is also crucial for the analysis of the ways in which different agencies and the fault-
lines they follow struggle to control them. Following David Harvey, a prominent author in the 
Marxist tradition of the historical analysis of capitalism, the authors think that this distinction 
can enhance our efforts to complement Marx’s theory of crises and over-accumulation of 
capital with the tracing of the paths that the credit and debt creation have taken in modern 
capitalism.  
On this, the authors follow the distinction between financial capital and finance capital. 
The former refers to that latter stage of capitalist development, at which globalization entails 
an extreme tendency of credit institutions and banks to intervene to – and up to a point, to 
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overshadow – the real economy. This is performed primarily via the introduction of complex 
practices and activities, which indicate the lack of commitment of this form of capital to the 
material production of value and surpluses. Thus, unlike finance capital, which was supposed 
to enable the expansion of the material conditions of the capitalist mode of production, this 
new form of capital both expands itself and undermine material production in the era of extreme 
financialization. This process defines what the authors call financialization or creditism. In this 
era, the debts and deficits, which the viciously circular path that financial capital follows via 
the generation of bubbles, are transferred to the tax-payers of the lower classes through the 
intervention of the state. It is at this point that the authors imply that in the era of 
financialization, neoliberalism goes hand in hand with higher-levels of taxation and other forms 
of domination, or violent state intervention.  
Yet, the analysis of the authors shows that not all states can be equally placed at the 
same level of risk towards this catastrophic movement of financial capital. While capitalism is 
likely to be undermined by malignant practices, the countries of the core can still take the 
advantage of the global flows of this form of uncontrolled credit: ‘the core is exporting capital 
goods and advanced commodities, whether “real” or “fictitious”, and the periphery is 
importing them’ (Fouskas and Dimoulas, 2013:27). It is at this point that the authors refer to 
the differences in prices between Germany and Greece in the shared monetary zone of the Euro. 
Germany here attains a hegemonic role because of its central position in a monetary structure, 
which allows for a mode of neo-colonial strategies among the countries that are positioned 
within it.  
The authors also refer to the higher inflation rate of Greece, compared to the one of 
Germany, as well as the Germany’s tactic of wage freezing that rendered the exported 
commodities of the latter more antagonistic within the monetary union. This practice means 
that the difference cannot be ‘corrected’ through modification in the currency differentials, and 
thus, one ends up with the creation of trade deficits. However, what is missing from this account 
is a more extensive analysis of the differences of productivity among the countries of the 
Eurozone. The problem is that these differences cannot be theorised in terms of Marx’s theory 
of value, because of its homogenizing aspect regarding the correspondence between the 
working hours that are needed to produce a good and the number of items that are produced.  
All in all, Fouskas and Dimoulas’ analysis casts light on the exploitation of the 
periphery from the core by means of deficit-production, and subsequently, of debt-creation in 
a global deleterious context of the relatively autonomized financial capital, the flows of which 
have been disoriented from material and/or geographical expansion.  
What is really interesting and academically intriguing at this point is that the authors 
recognize that imperialism can appear both in capitalist and pre-capitalist societies. 
Interestingly, the authors cast a historical gaze on the common characteristics of empires that 
proceeded in a form of financial expansion at the stage of development which was 
characterized by economic deceleration. Does systemic crisis lead to plasmatic stabilization as 
a mediatory stage that pre-dates the final decline of an empire? We believe that the authors lean 
towards giving a positive answer to this question, while remaining careful in sustaining a non-
determinist stance towards history. More specifically, such a non-deterministic stance is 
maintained towards the unpredictable forms that the capital might take in its co-production 
with culture, ideology, geo-politics and semi-independent institutions like the state.  
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Chapter 3 embarks on the second part of the book, offering a unique synthesis of 
insights into Greece’s fault lines and the political economy of debt. The analysis reviews the 
socio-political developments in Greece, starting from the foundation of the Greek state in 1830 
and up to the German occupation of the country by the Nazi troops. The authors start their 
analysis by making clear that the birth of the Greek state was permitted by European powers 
for specific geo-strategic reasons. A new state that is subordinated to Britain and France could 
both set new boundaries to the Ottoman empire and control the Russian and Egyptian 
aspirations in the eastern Mediterranean. According to the authors, this is the first and foremost 
fault-line of Greece. Thus, being a vassal subservient to the lord that had freed it, Greece had 
never had the level of independence that would allow taking full own initiative and exploiting 
its geo-strategic position. Its economy retained an agricultural character, resulting to Greece 
importing industrial goods and technology, while exporting mostly agricultural products. The 
authors argue this is Greece’s second fault line. This partially explains the persistent trade 
deficits, as well as the continuous borrowing requirements which lead to excessive debt 
creation and subsequent defaults. However, there were also internal reasons for excessive 
borrowing and debt creation. The Greek political system remained in a bi-polar kampfplatz 
which, according to the authors, contributed to and exacerbated the fault-lines discussed above, 
since the conflict between the liberal/modernizing faction and the conservative/populist one 
constituted a political phenomenology that guaranteed the prominence of the anti-communist 
discourses.  
In follow-up Chapter 4, the authors discuss how the retreat of the Nazi troops left a 
ruined country with destructed economic structures, with the situation becoming even worse 
after the subsequent civil war. As the authors argue in this chapter, Greece’s reconstruction 
would never have happened if the position of the country was not so crucial for security issues 
during the cold war. The authors claim that, after the defeat of the communist movement by 
the nationalist forces in 1949, Greece underwent through a new phase of patronism from 
abroad. As the authors explain, the new supervising force had two supervisees helping it in the 
anti-Soviet geo-political game in the area of eastern Mediterranean: Greece and Turkey. Yet, 
Turkey appeared in the eyes of the geo-strategy designers as more crucial for the anti-Stalinist 
line, as well as having broader territorial depth. It is in this sense, that in order to favour 
Turkey’s special geo-political demands in the Aegean, it was shown the green light for the 
dichotomisation of Cyprus.  
The authors analyse how this direct foreign interference in Greece was perpetuated with 
‘sophisticated’ methods. What the authors call the Greek kampfplatz, as the political 
phenomenology that render the anti-communist discourses prevalent, was not only supported 
by foreign agencies, but also by local political and economic elites that set their financial 
interests in line with the interests of the foreign capital. It was in such a toxic environment that 
Andreas Papandreou’s (a persona that had a central role in the political kampfplatz of that 
period) attempt to radicalize the discussion of the public requirement for a democratic reform 
in the 1960s led to the dictatorship of the Colonels, which arguably took place with support 
from abroad. This demarcated a constitutional rapture that lasted almost seven years, ending 
up with the invasion of Turkey to Cyprus, but also an era in which Greece remained tied to the 
interests of the advanced core. Thus, in spite of the economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s, 
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the Greek economy never managed to ‘catch up’ with the technological supremacy of the 
countries of the core.  
 In Chapter 5, the authors explain why Greek state elites failed, in the period after the 
dictatorship of the colonels, to follow the general fault-lines of financialization that the 
countries of the core followed towards a new globalized world order. The popular movement 
requiring democratic participation, geo-political issues related to Cyprus (leading to defence 
spending) and the poor industrial economic structure of Greece were proved to be important 
impulses for those elites to follow a peculiar clientistic Keynsianism, in a period in which the 
countries of the north implemented wage cuts, privatizations and welfare state retrenchment in 
view of the stagflagation of the 1970s. The dominant parties of the political kampfplatz of this 
period in Greece, promoted – or failed to prevent - policies of nationalization, extensive 
expenditure and borrowing. These were all primarily responsible for debt creation, which 
eventually led to the formation of a state-aided middle class that attained a parasitic status. 
These were all contributing forces to the undercutting of the power of the labour movement. 
As the authors note, it is at this historical stage that the dependency of the Greek economy 
moves from US post-war capital to EU subsidies and loans. Yet, Greek-style clientelism 
survived even after mid-1990s, i.e. after the Greek economy adopted financialization. Funding 
coming from EU programmes and wider borrowing possibilities led to the formation of a 
finance-oriented comprador class, with the result that the poor industrial structure of production 
of the Greek economy remained the case.  
In Chapter 6, the authors start the analysis by arguing for a power transition from USA 
and the West to the ‘global East’. They claim that neo-liberal economics cannot account for 
this transition, which had its origins in the decline of profitability that took place due to 
competition among US, European and Japanese capitalists. In this unstable global environment, 
the countries of the periphery that are dependent on the financial importation of fictitious 
capital from the core are even more vulnerable to capital fluctuations and systemic crises. More 
specifically, the case for the Greek economy is that its internal structure discussed above 
contributed to making the path towards the current debt crisis. The bipolarised political 
kampfplatz of PASOK and ND led to a continuously growing gap between real production of 
value and the import of inflationary money (debt), to sustain an emerging finance-oriented 
bourgeoisie. Therefore, it is clear that the authors adopt a multifactorial theorisation of the 
Greek case, in the sense that both external and internal factors are assumed to induce the Greek 
debt crisis. In addition, the authors provide a revealing and illuminating empirical and 
comparative analysis in showing this.  
 The authors argue, the Greek prime-minister Costas Simitis’ ‘modernisation’ 
programmatic agenda, which was implemented between 1996-2004, was actually nothing more 
than a further deepening stage of financialization of the Greek economy and the ruling elites. 
This agenda was succeeding practices of populism and clientism by PASOK in the years of 
Andreas Papandreou. Thus, the ruling elites found the chance to assume ‘the features of a 
“broker” between international/European financial capital, on the one hand, and the 
government, on the other’ (Fouskas and Dimoulas, 2013:144). This mode of transformation of 
the comprador class increased the level of dependence of the Greek economy, now not on the 
US post-war aid but on the cheap borrowing within the Eurozone instead. The various usurping 
activities of the European banks and other financial agencies were pernicious to any effort of 
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re-formation of the real economy and industrial re-organization of Greece. In this sense, 
Simitis’ ‘modernization’ phase was characterised by excessive corruption of those usurping 
elites that attained a mediatory role between the globalized financial capital and the domestic 
speculative and consumerist cycling of this capital. The seemingly high rates of growth of this 
period can only be conceived in parallel to a growth in the national debt of Greece. In its current 
crisis of debt, the burden of the recapitalization of the Greek banks is transferred to the 
taxpayer. At the same time and following subsequent bailouts, the Troika of international 
institutional creditors has implemented several rounds of austerity measures in Greece. The 
aftermath of these developments has been the utter impoverishment of the middle and lower 
classes.  
 In the final Chapter 7, the authors present the justification of their adamant view that 
the entry of Greece into the Eurozone has deteriorated the conditions of debt creation, but its 
origins should be traced through the concept of global, regional and domestic fault lines. These 
form a broader concept than uneven development, expressing the multifactorial dimension of 
debt creation and capitalist destruction of traditional socio-economic relations. In view of the 
catastrophic results of the subsequent rounds of austerity in the Greek society and economy, 
the authors propose a European and global cancelation of debt, promoted by socialist 
movements, especially in the periphery.  
Overall, we have found this book to be a most useful addition to the toolkit of the future 
analyst of the Greek economic crisis. Offering unique insights on the political, geo-strategic 
and historical origins of this modern Greek tragedy, it provides a unique assessment of the 
country’s global fault-lines. Despite its uniqueness and complexity, the book addresses large 
audiences of scholars, students and analysts, offering a uniquely insightful complementary 
perspective on the study of the Greek economic crisis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
